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In many ways, Edgar Allan Poe is a reader‟s writer. His grotesque thrills provide a kind 
of pandering titillation that scholarly investigation often resists. Poe was not well-loved by many 
of his contemporary writers, nor by academics today; even scholars who clearly admire his work 
often express an underlying discomfort with either the work, his image, or the extant evidence of 
his support for institutions like slavery. Denying or eliding the conservative politics expressed in 
his imaginative work and his correspondence would be both irresponsible and incorrect. But the 
material is just too complex to abandon the parallel project of unearthing its countercultural 
scripts.  
Poe‟s characters move through space in ways that radically question—and conceptually 
redefine—American violence. His textual corpus is insistently concerned about orders, spaces, 
and structures, and the taxonomic identifications they confer and protect. I see Poe‟s work as 
providing a kind of kinetic blueprint for moving in the world; or an interactive map: one that 
expresses spatial demarcations and offers the subject ideas for moving entirely beyond those 
demarcations. For Poe, the world‟s map must eventually be abandoned. In fact, in Eureka 
(1848), he argues for this abandonment as a cosmological inevitability. This paper explores the 
possibility of extrapolating Poe‟s kinetic cartography into a methodology that shows subjects 
how to move out of spaces that enclose them.  
A substantial amount of scholarship on Poe is, in fact, implicitly or explicitly concerned 
with the way space and structure operates in his tales, poems, and criticism. Hubert Zapf writes 
that “Poe‟s texts characteristically stage the tensions between order and chaos” (65), citing the 
“dialectic of construction and destruction…[that] is the central aesthetic operation” of his work. 
John T. Irwin sees the effort at “understanding how an apparently exitless enclosure may be 
exited” (143) as part of Poe‟s larger thematic project, especially citing his use of locked rooms, 
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labyrinths, and other imprisoning spaces. Gerhard Hoffman explores “Poe‟s use of setting as a 
spatial symbol” (1) that engenders a “mutual relationship between space and dweller” (2). Colin 
(Joan) Dayan recognizes in Poe “an exaggerated attachment to form and structure” (“Poetry” 
414). Robert L. Carringer notes that in Poe “space is unstable” and identifies in his tales a “threat 
of being confronted with diminishing space” (21). Douglas Anderson sees space in Poe 
configured as “complex structures of containment” (110) wherein “vessels” (ships, bodies, 
rooms) harbor “nested messages” (111) that ever recede into themselves; Anderson doesn‟t 
believe that Poe‟s world ever stops containing. Maurice J. Bennett describes in Poe a desire for a 
“„habitable‟ space” (262) that “stands as a formal antithesis to the chaos of human experience” 
(265) and argues that order‟s restoration represents victory in Poe‟s tales (267); here Bennett 
misses the unresolved tension that Poe maintains between order and chaos, even as he recognizes 
the crucial place they occupy. In his study of Eureka W.C. Harris writes that “if structure is itself 
given to hegemony, then the only way to actualize equality is to annihilate structure altogether” 
(22); in this way Harris prefigures my own argument that Poe‟s texts seek to disappear structures 
entirely rather than simply explore their effects. Laura Saltz argues that evasion and concealment 
comprise the underlying formal structure of “The Mystery of Marie Rôget” (240), linking space 
and structure to movement, as this paper does. In his study of architecture in Poe‟s tales, Richard 
Wilbur writes of the Usher mansion that “it remains standing only because the atmosphere of 
Usher‟s domain is perfectly motionless and dead” (107)—also linking space with movement and 
stasis. 
1
  
While very little scholarship directly links Poe with the history of taxonomies, many 
critics implicitly identify the taxonomic obsession in his work.
2
 Poe‟s tales employ an 
epistemological claim reminiscent of Michel Foucault‟s: that knowledge is constituted through 
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deviance from taxonomic labels. “It is as a convict, as a point of application for punitive 
mechanisms,” writes Foucault, “that the offender is constituted himself as the object of possible 
knowledge” (DP 251). For Foucault, nineteenth-century knowledge arises from the apprehension 
of abnormality, after which a theory of normality can be scripted, and normalized subjects can be 
placed into taxonomy‟s appropriate boxes. 
In “The Frame of Reference: Poe, Lacan, and Derrida”3 Barbara Johnson joins Foucault 
in her assertion that “knowledge itself is based on the imposition of definable objective frontiers 
and outlines whose possibility and/or justifiability are…being put into question. If 
„comprehension‟ is the framing of something whose limits are undeterminable, how can we 
know what we are comprehending?” She continues by noting “the play on the spatial and the 
criminal senses of the word frame” (357). Johnson‟s notions are important for a reading of Poe 
that sees his texts as dissolving the categories that are the foundations for knowledge, and her 
link between criminality and spatial framing is one that plays out in this study as well. Foucault‟s 
convicts provide a model through which to read Poe‟s delinquents and deviants: people to whom 
“punitive mechanisms” are applied. Or rather, the attempt to apply is present, though Poe‟s 
characters manage to resist and refuse it. They choose flight, thus avoiding absorption into the 
spaces that seek to organize them. Movement itself becomes the way to suspend or discard the 
taxonomic project, which is by definition a project of stilling. Movement, then, becomes 
inherently deviant, inherently criminal, to a social fabric that depends on taxonomies for the 
justification of its violence.
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I use the term “deviance” to describe Poe‟s negotiation of taxonomic space, conferring to 
the term a special status due to its double valence as both criminality and movement that tends or 
deflects from a standard or a fixed point. In Poe, the deviant occupies a privileged position. 
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Twisted characters and horrifying acts litter his corpus: dubiously sane individuals commit 
gruesome murders and dismembered bodies haunt incestuous and pedophilic characters. Perhaps 
what sets Poe apart from his American contemporaries is the weird amorality—the seeming 
relish and delight—that accompanies his spatial unmapping. His resistance to the cartographic 
and navigational limits imposed on bodies is always—it must be—figured as criminality. Poe‟s 
epistemological stance is dependent upon the criminality of the deviant, a kind of First Mover 
who sets the universe‟s diffusion in motion and maintains its expansion, “forcing the originally 
and therefore normally One into the abnormal condition of Many” (Poe, Eureka, 1278).  It is 
only the normality of the noncriminal that remains stable and still; criminality is always in 
process, in flux—moving—in order to elude the normalizing discourses that chase it. 
Much scholarship has defined Poe‟s criminality as ideologically conservative, asserting 
that the violence he renders against the body—especially socially marginalized bodies—
reinforces a social order dependent upon the violent subjugation of women and enslaved people. 
Teresa Goddu, for example, makes this point in Gothic America, noting that “the gothic can 
remain continuous with official narratives, even when it apparently contradicts them” (2). I agree 
with Goddu‟s claim, as I imagine most sensitive and engaged criticism would. But I maintain 
that, regardless of official narratives with which Poe‟s texts might be continuous, they are also 
capable of dissolving the categories on which the social structure is based. Poe‟s deviants attack 
the norms of civil and social life in the nineteenth century. Their criminality is by definition 
extrasocial: it must stand outside the social order to be able to define itself. The veneer of 
conservativism on the surface of the prose reveals, upon scrutiny, characters who are deeply 
disturbed by the social order. In Poe, what looks like embrace is actually embrasure: perpetual 
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spaces erected between objects and the words that name them; repetitions that devolve, upon 
endless reiteration, into the nonsense at their core.  
In order to diagram the mechanics of this deviance, I turn to a tale that has received less 
scholarly attention than other Poe works: “The System of Doctor Tarr and Professor Fether” 
(1845). In “Tarr and Fether,” a narrator visits an asylum where the inmates have locked up their 
keepers and are running the show. The asylum‟s ostensible superintendent has gained a 
reputation for his “system of soothing,” a newfangled style of caretaking in which the inmates 
freely roam the grounds, having been acculturated to the belief that they are sane. At the end of 
the tale, the original keepers who have been locked away break out of their containment and 
crash the party.  
“Tarr and Fether” can seem simplistically arch, coming off as one of Poe‟s more cutesy 
attempts at harmless discombobulation and snide critique. “When a madman appears thoroughly 
sane, indeed,” warns the asylum‟s superintendent, “it is high time to put him in a straight jacket” 
(713). Heh heh, a reader might think, I get it. The lure of reading the story as just another 
switcheroo can seem immense, and might account for the lack of critical attention it has 
received. If the tale is read only as a role-reversal, its potential for radical political intervention 
fizzles due to the reification of the very binaries it seeks to destabilize. How can the inmates be 
said to bust open taxonomies when they appear to simply reinstate the very disciplinary control 
to which insanity and criminality are subjected? 
But difficulties that immediately arise from the superintendent‟s seemingly facile joke 
can help direct a more nuanced analysis of the tale. Its events confirm a slim likelihood of 
correspondence between someone‟s appearance as insane and the actual status of their sanity. 
The tale provides no stable iteration of sanity for comparison; each character is a subjective 
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barometer, creating multiple definitions of sanity, like particles in space that are constantly 
repositioning. In the world of “Tarr and Fether,” it is never clear on whom the straightjacket 
should be placed. 
The tale asks readers to become uncomfortable with their definitions of sanity and 
insanity by questioning the binary logic that defines social subjects. If the inmates can take care 
of themselves, are they really insane? Are the properties ascribed to insanity based on inherent 
and immutable truths, or are they socially constructed and therefore malleable? As Poe warns in 
his cosmological work Eureka, “Being mutable, the „truths‟ which grow out of [axioms] are 
necessarily mutable too; or, in other words, are never to be positively depended on as truths at 
all” (1303). The socially-constructed designations of sanity and insanity can be read as one of 
Poe‟s “axioms” out of which a false idea of certainty arises. 
At the opening of “Tarr and Fether” the narrator is taking a leisurely ride through the 
countryside with a companion, “on a tour through the extreme Southern provinces of France” 
(699). Critics of nineteenth-century American literature will immediately recognize Poe‟s 
location as a veil for the American south, a geographical trope that will be invoked again in the 
tale when the narrator remarks, “I remember having been informed, in Paris, that the southern 
provincialists were a particularly eccentric people” (704).5 Poe makes the issue local and 
palpable when he embeds his critique of social and legal practices in the American south. But the 
simultaneous location of the story at some remove, in France, permits a reading of the tale as a 
more generally applicable critique of social structures, not locatable in any specific national 
border because universally pervasive. The layering of locations provides an opportunity to think 
about Poe‟s tale as working in a number of shifting registers, covering the globe. 
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The narrator becomes curious about the famous asylum he spies in the distance, and 
decides to visit it in order to see for himself the “system of soothing” invented and implemented 
by its superintendent, Monsieur Maillard. The narrator expresses doubt as to whether he will be 
allowed on the grounds unannounced. His traveling companion, who has been previously 
introduced to the superintendent, decides to provide the introduction.  
This introduction, however, is never narrated; the narrator sees “the visage of a man 
peering through” the asylum‟s gate, who then “accosted my companion by name” (700). Though 
no introductions are ever textually spoken, the narrator satisfies himself that the man is Monsieur 
Maillard, partially based on his appearance as a “portly, fine-looking gentleman of the old 
school, with a polished manner, and a certain air of gravity, dignity, and authority” (700). This 
ambiguous introduction signals the unreliability of empirical perception that shrouds the tale. 
Upon the superintendent‟s performance of breeding, the narrator immediately slots him into the 
ranks of sanity, a move the narrator will repeat again despite Maillard‟s later injunction to 
beware of appearances. In this way, the (non)narration keeps categorical logics forever 
suspended in a game that involves the narrator, the other characters, and the reader, all of whom 
form a triad that cooperatively keeps taxonomic labels from settling onto the text. This triadic 
relationship emerges as another mode of movement, or deviance, employed through Poe‟s texts, 
like a game of telephone or volleyball where objects remain “up in the air” or “in play,” and 
information might at any point become garbled as it progresses through the text. Importantly, if 
information is vulnerable enough to be garbled, it can‟t be said to naturally or self-evidently 
inhere; any dictum can be rendered mutable; any ledger illegible. 
The narrator is ushered into an explicitly civilized parlor of “refined taste” containing 
“many books, drawings, pots of flowers, and musical instruments” (700), replete with a “smart 
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footman in livery” (701). The narrator‟s eye locates all the signs of culture, and again implicitly 
conflates culture with sanity. He encounters a beautiful young woman at the parlor‟s piano but, 
because he has heard that the inmates are left to freely roam the asylum, he “cannot be sure that 
she was sane” (700). He searches her countenance but finds no clue to the status of her mental 
condition, save the “certain restless brilliancy about her eyes” (700) which he tentatively ascribes 
to possible insanity. She “replied in a perfectly rational manner” (700) to the narrator, but he 
remains uncertain of her sanity until Maillard informs him that she is his niece. Significantly, 
Maillard does not directly confirm the niece‟s sanity, but only infers it, offering the assurance of 
genealogical relation as a stand-in for the assurance of sanity. The narrator‟s reliance on 
ambivalent visual data and codes of behavior and performance produce anxiety around his effort 
to identify the subjects before him, and that anxiety is kept in play by readers who have also been 
activated to question the niece‟s sanity.  
Maillard‟s niece is described by the narrator to be “excessively, although to my taste, not 
unpleasingly pale” (700), signaling her compatriotism with other Poe ladies of tenuous vitality. 
While Maillard‟s niece will not die and revive several times, like Ligeia and other of Poe‟s half-
dead corpses, she does serve as the initial signifier for the role that “pale” bodies play in his 
corpus: they destabilize binaries and boundaries through their permeability.
6
 The seasoned Poe 
reader will recognize the niece as a character in whose body the instability of taxonomy will play 
out. But for the narrator, the niece‟s appearance is illegible; thus, for him, her psychological 
status remains in flux between the two possible poles of sanity and insanity. She inhabits a 
anatomically impossible space; the clues that emerge from her body—the pale countenance, the 
bright eyes, the rational conversation, the piano aria—recall multiple taxonomic categories for 
the narrator and so fail to fix her in place. She successfully eludes identification in this instance, 
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which amounts to a deferral of identification in the scope of the tale; she will eventually become 
“known” as insane to the narrator, but by the time she can be identified as insane, the 
sanity/insanity binary has been so destabilized that none of the characters—including the 
narrator—can confidently utilize its signifying codes for disciplinary classification. 
The niece‟s unknowability branches out to encompass the asylum‟s entire population. 
Maillard invites the narrator to a dinner in the asylum‟s formal dining room attended by almost 
thirty guests, all who appear to be Maillard‟s friends. Before dinner Maillard warns the narrator 
that “the time will arrive when you will learn to judge for yourself what is going on in the world, 
without trusting to the gossip of others. Believe nothing you hear, and only one half of what you 
see” (703). Maillard‟s injunction anticipates the complete dissolution of morphologies—organic 
and linguistic—that the narrator‟s unreliable sense data makes possible; his warning is even 
more remarkable because the narrator will fail to heed it. To the narrator, the dinner guests are 
“apparently, people of rank—certainly of high breeding” (703, italics mine)—signifiers of 
culture and, thus, sanity. But he cannot seamlessly read their ostentatious or anachronistic 
clothing into the narrative of their comportment—the niece‟s “hoop and farthingale, with high-
heeled shoes, and a dirty cap of Brussels lace” (704) is one example of the strange combinations 
he encounters. The incompatibility of the guest‟s appearances and behaviors further suspends the 
narrator‟s attempts to pin their identities in place.  
As the dinner commences, the narrator discovers that “the topic of lunacy was, much to 
my surprise, a favorite one with all present” (705). During the dinner conversation each guest 
describes an inmate who used to reside at the asylum, and then physically mimics that 
description: 
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“[W]e had here, not long ago, a person who had taken it into his head that 
he was a donkey—which, allegorically speaking, you will say, was quite true. He 
was a troublesome patient; and we had much ado to keep him within bounds. For 
a long time he would eat nothing but thistles; but of this idea we soon cured him 
by insisting upon his eating nothing else. Then he was perpetually kicking out his 
heels—so—so—” 
“Mr. De Kock! I will thank you to behave yourself!” here interrupted an 
old lady, who sat next to the speaker. “Please keep your feet to yourself!” (706, 
italics mine) 
 
Mr. De Kock‟s rhetoric of failed boundaries can be applied to the other guests. Each guest, in 
turn, acts out the peccadilloes of madness attributed to a former inmate, and is then interrupted 
by another guest who acts out a different former inmate‟s behaviors. In mimicking previous 
residents of the asylum, the dinner guests echo an index of symptoms ascribed to insanity. But 
these acts of repetition fail to fix those behaviors to any single person or condition. The codes of 
insanity shadow themselves through the suggestion of something that was once present in an 
original and embodied state but cannot be fully recovered. The reiteration of insanity is 
transported into the contemporary present space of the dining room, but also always refers back 
to the imagined location and time of the original production of these behaviors.
7
 This temporal 
circuit takes up space in the same way that each repetition takes up a new space, moving from 
itself to the next copy of itself, never quite identical and never still.  
Interrupting the guests‟ discourse is Maillard, who continually pushes strange dishes—
“rabbit au-chát, for example—upon the narrator. A band of “seven or eight people with fiddles, 
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fifes, trombones, and a drum” interrupts the whole company “at intervals” (705) during the meal, 
and the cacophony is punctuated by intermittent offstage howls, which Maillard explains as the 
howls of asylum inmates locked in their cells under his new “system of exclusion.” The narrator 
is bewildered by the experience and, after yet another guest rehearses the theatrics of insanity, he 
exclaims to Maillard: 
 
“You astonish me!” said I; and I looked inquisitively at Monsieur 
Maillard. 
“Ha! ha! ha!” said that gentleman—“he! he! he!—hi! hi! hi!—ho! ho! 
ho!—hu! hu! hu!—very good indeed! You must not be astonished, mon ami; our 
friend here is a wit—a drôle—you must not understand him to the letter.” (708) 
 
This is an absolutely bizarre moment in the text, characterized by its nonsense. The denuded 
vowel sounds emitted by the superintendent signal a breakdown of morphological meaning that 
occurs on the level of language; each vowel is orated but not articulated. The individual letters of 
each vowel unmoor from the taxonomic box of the word, slipping from the superintendent‟s 
mouth only to bump against exclamatory punctuating marks. Language, reveals Maillard, is just 
another appearance; it mustn‟t be held to a standard of representing itself “to the letter.” The 
repeated vowel sounds stand for all of the stymieing repetitive language and behavior emitted by 
the guests; their quacks and kicks do not represent the former inmates “to the letter” any more 
than they represent insanity itself.
8
  
Of course, as the narrator soon discovers, those quacks and kicks don‟t represent the 
former inmates, either. He finally suspects that the guests, in acting out the behaviors of insanity 
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attributed to someone else, might actually be acting out themselves. He observes of one of the 
guests: “I was much astonished to hear [her] addressed as Madame Joyeuse, after the description 
of Madame Joyeuse she had just given” (709). This astonishment is repeated when Maillard‟s 
niece launches into a description of one Eugénie Salsafette, “who thought the ordinary mode of 
habiliment indecent, and wished to dress herself, always, by getting outside of her clothes” 
(709); the guests then scream for “Mam‟selle Salsafette” to put her clothes back on as the niece 
begins to disrobe, inferring that she is the Salsafette she mimics. As Shawn Rosenheim argues 
about Freud‟s Wolf Man and the Dupin tales, it is “an essential but impossible task to say 
whether the words name a real event or whether in themselves they produce the symptoms they 
are meant to explain” (156). The guests‟ repetitions work similarly for the narrator: the words 
might name the “real event” of their bodies, the “real event” of past bodies, or just the 
“symptoms” of insanity they act out. The ability to assign to these bodies attributes that indicate 
or correspond to their essential identity is here frustrated; the names do not quite adhere to their 
bearers, as they refer both to the present guests and to past guests, half imaginary but half 
iterated in the present bodies. The urge for Eugénie to get “outside of” her clothes echoes the 
tale‟s fundamental trope of categorical taxonomies—manifested as buildings and bodies and 
words—that bind to the subject and must be shed. 
The guests are suddenly interrupted by “a series of loud screams, or yells, from some 
portion of the main body of the chateau” (709). The narrator is confused by the yells, but he finds 
the reaction of the guests completely pitiable: 
 
They all grew as pale as so many corpses, and, shrinking within their seats, sat 
quivering and gibbering with terror, and listening for a repetition of the sound. It 
14 
 
came again—louder and seemingly nearer—and then a third time very loud, and 
then a fourth time with a vigor evidently diminished. At this apparent dying away 
of the noise, the spirits of the company were immediately regained, and all was 
life and anecdote as before. (710) 
 
Now all the guests, not just Eugénie, have become the pale bodies that, for Poe, do the work of 
disarticulation. The sounds from which the guests shrink are like the terrifying photographic 
negatives to their own festivities: repeated sounds that never materialize into a connective 
syntax. The narrator, as usual, is preoccupied with appearance: for him, the howls appear, seem, 
and possess the capacity for evidence. The use of “anecdote” feels important here; with its usage, 
the narrator describes the guests as summaries or accounts of themselves, displacing their speech 
and behavior away from the immediate physicality of their bodies and truncating the experience 
of the dinner into a “story” of itself. This characterization of the dinner and its guests as 
anecdotal foregrounds language and appearance as labile; words and behaviors are summaries of 
the bodies to which they are assigned, rather than transparent representations—or, perhaps, 
summaries are representations, never essences.
9
  
The narrator‟s use of “anecdote” can also be read in the mode of deviation or devious 
movement: it pulls the guests away from their bodies, extracting their behavior and rearranging 
or summarizing it simultaneous to its occurrence. A space opens here and a revolution is 
undertaken: the extraction of language or apparent behaviors from the guest‟s bodies and the 
simultaneous replacement of altered language back onto the bodies from which it originated 
instills a kind of constantly whirring mechanism into the text and into the narrator‟s mode of 
analysis.
10
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This is also the first time in the story that the threat of violence becomes palpable. 
Whoever or whatever produces the noises inspires genuine, debilitating terror in the guests. A 
whole history, then, is invisible to the narrator but encoded in the guests‟ reactions. The threat of 
the anonymous screams is the threat of boundaries imminently dissolving; the guests fear the 
screams because their issuers might not stay in their contained space; they have the power to 
enter the dining room and disrupt whatever world Maillard and the guests have created. This is, 
at the very least, the threat of structural violence: walls and foundations that might not hold.
11
 If 
Poe‟s texts advocate the exposure of the taxonomic project as violent, and then subsequently 
seek to dissolve the structures of taxonomies, then the screamers behind the wall might be the 
“good guys,” with their threat to explode the structures that contain them. But, clearly, the story 
also asks us to root for the guests as exterminators of taxonomy. In this way, Poe‟s text confuses 
the discrete conferral of criminality; everyone, the story seems to claim, must move as a deviant 
in order to break through the paradigms that structure social subjects. I hesitate to say it, but I 
believe that Poe‟s stories argue for criminality and violence as revolutionary.  
I don‟t mean to suggest that Poe‟s violations aren‟t creepy—the wrenching of Berenice‟s 
teeth from her mouth, or the dismemberment of the L‟Espanaye women, could turn anyone‟s 
stomach, especially from the inference of sexual violence. We needn‟t accept Poe‟s version of 
the violations; his methodology might prove more useful to different circumstances entirely. 
What I do mean to suggest is that Poe helps direct readers to identify the concept of violation as 
importantly antithetical to the dovetailed carpentry of social orders: only a boundary, only a box, 
only a wall can be said to be violated. As Poe argues through Eureka‟s borderless oneness and 
unity, the absence of taxonomies is achieved through structural violence. 
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But I digress (a devious movement).
12
 Back in the dining room, the unnerved narrator 
presses Maillard for explanations of the events he observes. Maillard assures the narrator that the 
screamers are just the asylum‟s inmates, who formerly roamed the grounds freely but have since 
been locked away under his new “system of exclusion.” Maillard explains that these inmates are 
all men—“stout fellows”—to which the narrator expresses surprise, having been under the 
impression that “the majority of lunatics were of the gentler sex” (710)—a sex to which, of 
course, the majority of the dinner guests belong. In lieu of further explanation, Maillard and the 
guests just echo themselves back to the narrator, in word and deed, enacting a spiraling 
multiplication of language through their continuous repetitions: 
 
“Some time ago, there were about twenty-seven patients here; and, of that 
number, no less than eighteen were women; but, lately, matters have changed 
very much, as you see.” 
“Yes—have changed very much, as you see,” here interrupted the 
gentleman who had broken the shins of Ma‟mselle Laplace. 
“Yes—have changed very much as you see!” chimed in the whole 
company at once. (710) 
 
But the narrator doesn‟t “see” any change to which the guests refer, because that change is 
beyond his scope, having ostensibly occurred before his arrival at the asylum; these changes are 
safely stowed in another location—unless they can “break” the dining room‟s “walls.” Maillard‟s 
early injunction to the narrator to trust his own sense data begins to look like a strategy of 
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deviation, a way for Maillard to establish distance between himself and the narrator, and to move 
his guests—his charges—away from the narrator‟s taxonomic gaze. 
In response, the narrator explicitly communicates to Maillard his diagnosis of the guests 
as insane. Maillard denies each charge. In rejoinder to each of Maillard‟s denials, the narrator 
begins repeating himself. Four consecutive times, after the narrator has questioned a guest‟s 
sanity and Maillard has countered him, the narrator replies, “„To be sure,‟ said I—„to be sure‟” 
(711). Colloquially, this phrase might read as, “Oh, yes, absolutely, of course,” and if read in 
such a way it would act as the narrator‟s validation of Maillard‟s sanity, his capacity to correctly 
judge the guests. But the repeated iteration of sureness also insists on the narrator‟s own 
taxonomic sanity—he is sure, like Maillard, that categorical logic is being upheld—while 
simultaneously imprinting the guests with legibility—he is sure of the guests‟ sanity. The 
narrator‟s repetitions destabilize his secure identity as sane, since he has now adopted the 
reiterative practices of insanity.
13
 But those repetitions also bring him closer to the language of 
the guests and therefore potentially closer to decoding them and rendering them perfectly legible 
and fixed in a stasis that refers back to and reassures his own static sanity: if the guests can be 
stilled into their category, then the narrator can remain at a polar opposition.
14
  
Following a series of yells now very close to the dining room, “it became evident that 
some persons outside were endeavoring to gain entrance into the room. The door was beaten 
with what appeared to be a sledge-hammer, and the shutters were wrenched and shaken with 
prodigious violence” (715). The screamers—evidently, of course, in the narrator‟s unchanging 
vocabulary—have breached the dining room. In the scene that ensues, the guests, who are now 
understood by the reader to have always actually been the original inmates of the asylum, shift 
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from acting themselves out to representing themselves in metonym,
15
 by way of the chief trait of 
their condition.
16
  
 
Meantime, upon the dining table, among the bottles and glasses, leaped the 
gentleman, who, with such difficulty, had been restrained from leaping there 
before. … At the same moment, the man with the tee-totum predilections, set 
himself to spinning around the apartment, with immense energy, and with arms 
outstretched at right angles with his body; so that he had all the air of a tee-totum 
in fact, and knocked every body down that happened to get in his way. And now, 
too, hearing an incredible popping and fizzing of champagne, I discovered at 
length, that it proceeded from the person who performed the bottle of that delicate 
drink during dinner. And then, again, the frog man croaked away as if the 
salvation of his soul depended upon every note that he uttered. (715) 
 
The presence of the original keepers unleashes in the inmates a full-scale embrace of—or 
regression back to—their insanity. There is no longer any pretense to systems of soothing or 
exclusion; fear, confusion, or the threat of the keepers‟ re-incarceration has lifted from the 
inmates the burden of culture and the signifying gestures of sanity.  
In this purely metonymic moment the inmates enact their most devious movements, away 
from that incarceration. The frogman enacts frogness, but the narrator would identify him as 
insane. The inmates become both multiply identifiable and also utterly illegible and therefore 
unidentifiable: are the inmates actually themselves, or are they the characters of themselves? Are 
they acting out being dinner guests, are the dinner guests acting out being inmates, or are the 
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insane inmates acting as insane inmates? The inmates‟ behavioral practices—repetition, 
metonymic representation—cannot be translated by the narrator into taxonomic legibility. 
Instead, their practices set off a spiral of transformations, during which the inmates elude a 
classifying gaze that depends on representational transparency. Or, inversely, transformation 
cannot be translated; it remains inscrutable and illegible. The inmates translate the language of 
themselves, through echo, into the language of themselves. They move further and further away 
from the “original” locution, transforming themselves into iterations—and reiterations—of 
themselves.
17
  
Or, read another way, through the distancing violence of the metonym the inmates 
occupy both the space of their bodies and the space of the body‟s representation. In this split, 
they inhabit both pure physicality and pure abstraction. Any taxonomically useful property 
extracted from the metonymic representation—frogness—is difficult to recuperate back into the 
physical fact of the body—humanness. The repetition, mimicry, and outlandish costuming of the 
dinner guests/inmates suggests that the essential properties that supply taxonomies cycle through 
bodies rather than inhering in them, and are dependent upon a necessarily unreliable perceiver.  
The anatomy of the policing in which the inmates engage seems very important to 
diagram; as we have seen, the desire to generalize and extrapolate about the mechanics of the 
tale can quickly lead to the deflation of its anarchic charge. At the beginning of the tale, in the 
first few minutes after their meeting, Maillard tells the narrator that he had “return[ed] to the old 
usages” by “enforc[ing] a system of rigid exclusion” (701) upon the inmates, and had “set each 
lunatic to guard the actions of all the others. […] In this way we were enabled to dispense with 
an expensive body of keepers” (702). When readers discover that the inmates have actually 
locked up their keepers and taken on their roles, this “rigid exclusion” starts to resemble the 
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narrator‟s attempts to regulate the subjects that surround him. In fact, the inmates do police each 
other: during the dinner party, they constantly interrupt and chastise each other in the midst of 
their repetitions—but only for the purpose of generating their own repetitious acts. 
Further troubling the question of whether the inmates simply reify disciplinary control, 
the tale takes place inside the confining interior space of the asylum and its dining room, and the 
inmates have reversed the seeming laxity and freedom of the “system of soothing” in favor of 
architecture‟s constraint. But Poe suggests that the straightjacket is not the problem, nor is the 
asylum. The structural objects that confine bodies to taxonomic control are just symptoms of the 
larger anxiety Poe betrays about structurality itself. And in the end, the deviant body is always 
the ultimate location to which Poe‟s inquiry inclines. 
The deviant body can be read as a spatial map on which the self-policing impulse locates 
itself. Foucault writes: 
 
The delinquent…is not only the author of his acts (the author responsible in 
terms of certain criteria of free, conscious will), but is linked to his offence by a 
whole bundle of complex threads (instincts, drives, tendencies, character). The 
penitentiary technique bears not on the relation between author and crime, but on 
the criminal‟s affinity with his crime (253). 
 
The deviant body is a space in, on, and through which deviant movement potentially originates, 
erupts, and cycles. Through Foucault‟s formulation, the deviant body becomes a self-sustaining 
unit in which its ability to be located or placed is absorbed into itself, bypassing or recuperating 
the externality of the gaze required for classification. The inmates, then, are not simply offenders 
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who have violated some law; they encompass their offence, and also become delinquents through 
the connection the narrator perceives between that offence and their essential selves. The 
delinquent does not simply perform the action of a crime. He is in a relationship with his 
criminality through threads and networks that constitute him as an individual and provide the 
conditions out of which he is able to commit his act.  
This image of the deviant‟s relationship to his criminality visually resembles or replicates 
the structure of the Panopticon: the delinquent is the centralized locus from which threads and 
networks of criminality reach outward to create his crime, and then reach back inward to 
constitute him as a criminal, reinstating his identity as a deviant; he becomes the fixed gaze of 
the central tower onto which circumstances bear and into which penetrates whole disciplinary 
mechanisms that constitute his body. He is both writer (through the commission of his criminal 
act) and written upon. Both the panoptic prison and the delinquent body are architectural 
concepts; they manage space. The delinquent body is panoptic architecture, alive with nodes of 
possible interference and disruption.
18
 In this way, the specific institutional architectures—the 
prison, the asylum, the school—stand in for the body itself. Faulting the institutional enclosure is 
too easy; it is the very notion of enclosure that Poe problematizes with his ever-permeable, 
vagrant bodies. 
The inmates of “Tarr and Fether” do not dismantle the system; they change their (spatial) 
relationship to it, forcing the original disciplinary gaze to chase after them in its effort to fix and 
indentify. At some point in the unceasing process of the chase, that disciplinary gaze starts to 
look more and more like the deviants it chases, like the narrator in “Tarr and Fether” who 
gradually accrues onto himself the behaviors and speech rituals of insanity; his performance 
eventually becomes nearly indiscernible from that of the inmates. The inmates have manifested 
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for themselves “a situation that seems to question assumptions as basic as the physical continuity 
of inner and outer and the noninterpenetrability of solid bodies” (143), as John T. Irwin writes of 
the Dupin tales. Indeed, the inner and outer spheres—the dining room, the locked-away keepers, 
the breaking of windows that admits the escaped keepers back inside—are not only continually 
confused; they are conflated until they blend into sameness, like the solid objects of the world 
spun into unity in Eureka. Irwin‟s suggestion that solid bodies in Poe‟s tales are always 
interpenetrating is made manifest in “Tarr and Fether” through the reiterative bodies of the 
guests/inmates and the subsequent dissolution of borders they beget. 
In his introduction to The Order of Things Foucault writes: 
 
The history of madness would be the history of the Other—of that which, for a 
given culture, is at once interior and foreign, therefore to be excluded (so as to 
exorcise the interior danger) but by being shut away (in order to reduce its 
otherness); whereas the history of the order imposed on things would be the 
history of the Same—of that which, for a given culture, is both dispersed and 
related, therefore to be distinguished by kinds and to be collected together into 
identities. (xxiv) 
 
“Tarr and Fether” fleshes out—and complicates—Foucault‟s “history of madness”; it is difficult 
to identify who is “Other” in a tale that excludes some bodies, and then others, and then none, 
and excises appearance and behavior from the bodies that generate them. But it is into Poe‟s 
cosmological opus Eureka that Foucault‟s “history of the Same” is encoded. Eureka might be 
described, indeed, as the “history of the order imposed” upon the universe, but also as the history 
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of order retracted; Eureka longs for the absence of boundaries upon which order depends. Much 
scholarship has argued that Eureka lays out a compositional practice that can retroactively 
inform the rest of Poe‟s work.19 In the above passage Foucault also helps establish a link 
between “Tarr and Fether”—and all of Poe‟s tales—and Eureka, and for this reason I turn briefly 
to the text of Eureka as a way to understand what, for Poe, might have been the wider 
cosmological implications of the unstable structures that permeate his work.
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In the opening movements of Eureka, the narrator instructs his readers how to inquire 
into the structure of the universe. They must relinquish any attachment to solutions or fixed 
concepts, which falsely attribute an ordering telos to the act of inquiry. “I am convinced,” states 
the narrator, “that no human being can [entertain the conception of Infinity],” but that, “so long 
as we continue the effort…we are tending to the formation of the idea designed; while the 
strength of the impression that we actually form or have formed it, is in the ratio of the period 
during which we keep up the mental endeavor” (1274). Eureka‟s narrator teaches that a 
conception can only be “grasped” so long as the thinker is in the process of grasping it; logically, 
this is no “grasping” at all, because something that constantly moves, that constantly proceeds, 
cannot ever be grasped. Throughout, Eureka advocates this process-driven epistemology that 
resists the stillness of certainty. One of the foundational elements of this text is its defense of 
perpetual movement—the asymptotic “tending to” that forever leans into an unachievable 
finitude, like the inmates‟ repetitions in “Tarr and Fether” that forever stray away from the 
original utterance. 
Eureka‟s narrator suggests that “[h]e who from the top of Aetna casts his eyes leisurely 
around, is affected chiefly by the extent and diversity of the scene. Only by a rapid whirling on 
his heel could he hope to comprehend the panorama in the sublimity of its oneness” (1261). The 
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“diversity” of which the narrator speaks reads like the unfolding of taxonomically distinct 
categories across the landscape, categories whose dissolution requires the rapid and continual 
movement of the perceiving subject. The narrator traces the origin of the universe back to an 
irrelative oneness, “one particle” (1277)—matter in its simplest form—which diffused outward 
and diversified, radiating indefinitely, by dint of the “Thought of God [which] originat[ed] the 
diffusion” (1301). But Poe‟s universe does not expand outward indefinitely, and instead expands 
and then, hypothetically, contracts back into unity, which each particle ever desires. This is, of 
course, just what Poe argues for the universe of “Tarr and Fether”: every deviation, every 
movement, is like that spin on Aetna‟s (imaginary) peak; it further confuses the ability to assign 
sanity or insanity to any of the bodies in the asylum, and every character begins to resemble 
every other. The story draws ever closer to the irrelative oneness that appears, to the taxonomic 
eye, as the chaos of non-differentiation.  
The domain of space into which Eureka unfolds is the space in which the universe enacts 
itself: 
 
[I]n using the phrase, “Infinity of Space,” I make no call upon the reader to 
entertain the impossible conception of an absolute infinity. I refer simply to the 
“utmost conceivable expanse” of space—a shadowy and fluctuating domain, now 
shrinking, now swelling, with the vacillating energies of the imagination. (1275) 
 
For Eureka‟s narrator, words and their definitions are just a stand-in for the process that is 
comprehension. The expanse of space which he dubs “infinity” is ceaselessly moving in tandem 
with the imagination; the imagination itself produces the collapse and expanse of the universe. In 
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this way, the text defines space itself as imagined and therefore mutable, drawing parallels 
between the operations of the mind and the operations of the universe. Bounded, demarcated 
space is, for Poe, imagined, just as words only imaginarily represent concepts to which they are 
attached. Like Maillard‟s guttural vowel utterances that warn the narrator against relying upon 
language “to the letter,” Poe‟s words are the means by which “one human being might put 
himself in relation at once with another human being and with a certain tendency of the human 
intellect”; a word, in Eureka, is “by no means the expression of an idea—but of an effort at one. 
…Man needed a term by which to point out the direction of this effort” (1272). In both Eureka 
and “Tarr and Fether” language indicates movement: it directs the speaker and hearer toward that 
which cannot be uttered, rather than transparently inhering in objects. Taxonomies thereby 
become unintelligible: the words or properties that assign subjects or objects to categories don‟t 
necessarily adhere; they can be peeled away at any moment—at the moment, in fact, that the 
universe contracts into irrelative oneness—and it is revealed that it was only the construction of 
the word that permitted the subject‟s entry into one category or another. If “sanity” or “insanity” 
fail to adhere to any bearer, then those categories fail to mean. 
Eureka‟s characterization of the spatial universe is the culmination of a body of work that 
explores movement itself as a mode of deviance—as a radical criminality. Social unrest 
imbricates Poe‟s fictions, infused as they are with political and ethical inquiry, even as they often 
look like—and, as many scholars argue, often are—a conservative backlash against that unrest. 
Poe‟s exploration of deviance and violence can be so sickening that it makes possible such a 
conservative reading, one that advocates for Poe‟s texts as normativity reinscribed. But, as I 
argue above, I believe that in Poe, violence—deviance—criminality itself is revolutionary. In 
tales like “The Man of the Crowd” space is traversed through urban pursuit, during which the 
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narrator chases after an unusual man for whom he cannot find a label. The physical facts of his 
person that might ordinarily serve to identify him fail to mean, producing traces that dissipate 
into the darkness of the city‟s alleyways before they can be followed. In tales like “Ligeia” a 
woman‟s abnormalized body (a space in its own right)21 is displaced and replaced through 
multiple substitutions in a narrator‟s effort to finally discover the correct, normal body that obeys 
his logic; this final body, though, refuses normality in favor of a gruesomely uncanny iteration. 
In tales like “Morella,” where a man expresses sexual desire for the living daughter who inhabits 
the body of his dead wife, the revolving instability of the body becomes a way to question 
patriarchal genealogy and the ethics of incestual relations. The narrator is “criminal” in his 
intent, but Morella, too, opens a productively deviant space through her corporeal substitutions 
that, as with Ligeia, trade one body for another. In the Dupin tales the interpreting subject is 
forcibly relocated from an original act of murder through the distancing mechanisms of 
metonymy, a distance that makes the violence more, not less, horrifying and obvious.  
Movement is, of course, a different kind of resistance than armed conflict. The subject 
who drifts or bolts from normalcy is not necessarily—or not only—defined against the 
categories that long to (re)organize her; rather, they both take up the same space. The deviant 
and the mechanisms that classify her must be in constant negotiation for that space. Poe‟s 
deviants do not revolt. They do not attempt to dismantle the categories that want to enfold them. 
Rather, through constant movement they shift the locations of their bodies, skirting the languages 
and practices that reach out to describe them, thereby maintaining an uncrossable distance 
between themselves and taxonomy‟s labels. The yawn that opens between point a and the 
subsequent reiteration, differing, deferring, or distancing movement toward point b creates an 
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unclassifiable intermediary space inhabited by subjects who disturb categorical boundaries. The 
actions of deviance produce these intermediary spaces inside which identity can never be fixed.  
Eureka‟s circumscription of the “Infinity of Space” echoes the engagement with material 
spatial structures in other of Poe‟s tales. The establishment of highly charged material spaces 
functions as both an extension and thwarting of discipline. Architecture is never invisible or 
incidental in Poe. His spaces read like an inventory of the four institutions that constitute 
Foucault‟s square of nineteenth-century discipline: the tombs into which living bodies are 
prematurely interred, representing prisons; the school in which William Wilson fractures into the 
evil twin of himself; the many sickbeds that microcosmically represent hospitals; and the asylum 
in which the inmates of “Tarr and Fether” invert roles and repeat themselves. His labyrinthine 
hallways, bedchambers, libraries, and cells produce or frustrate conditions for the staging of 
deviance and are intimately connected with its practice.  
Political critiques that emerge from the negotiation of space are not limited to Poe. 
Nineteenth-century American narratives consistently link the traversal of material and 
metaphoric space to political struggles; whether through Melville‟s annihilation of whiteness 
made possible only at sea, Whitman‟s employment of the liturgical long line as a corollary to the 
expansion of body and spirit, or Dickinson‟s ejaculatory dashes that push against or even 
puncture women‟s imprisoning spaces. The nineteenth-century American anxiety about 
structural mechanics and structural soundness might be said to originate, in part, from complex 
negotiations of the social and political fabric of the country. The exploration of the American 
frontier anxiously reiterated the nation‟s original violent settlements that located and bound 
uncharted peoples and spaces. The challenges to and ultimate dissolution of chattel slavery that 
marked the period called attention to space itself in the form of persistent and pervasive 
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categorizations of human beings. Those categories can be seen as spaces, policed by the 
individuals who inhabited them and the official discourses of law, science, and social science 
that stood outside and defined them.
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In Poe, too, spaces threaten; the pressure he puts on structures to hold becomes a 
suspension, almost a wish, against the threat of their breakdown and dissolution; Poe‟s imagined 
worlds are so unstable that they cannot be willed to cohere. Whether manifested as buildings, 
bodies, or institutions, Poe‟s spatially-embodied structures generate an incredible fear that their 
buttresses will not stabilize definitely, like the universe described in Eureka that perpetually 
mobilizes and demobilizes. His universe forever expands and contracts to accommodate both the 
incredible terror of structure‟s absence—void—and the necessary resistance to the ideologies 
that various material and political structures protect. 
In this light, the lure of Poe for both structuralism and poststructuralism becomes 
obvious: Poe‟s writing seduces critical apparatuses that question and disassemble structurality. 
French poststructuralism, especially, may be said to have germinated in Poe and in the frenetic 
structuralizing endeavors of nineteenth-century Europe and America. Foucault‟s body of work 
emerges from this twentieth-century poststructuralist moment to inquire into the relationship 
between knowledge and institutional structures. His The Order of Things (1970) and Discipline 
and Punish (1977) are seminal texts directly engaging nineteenth-century deviance and 
criminality. Foucault seems especially linked to Poe; both writers are highly attuned to the horror 
of spaces and the threat of structural machinery, and both use gothic language in the scenes that 
punctuate their theories. Foucault‟s work helps draw out the relationship in Poe between 
criminality as deviance, and deviation—movement away from normality—as deviance. In this 
way, I argue for poststructuralism as a historically-grounded methodology that, in part, grows out 
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of Poe‟s theoretical problems with structurality. To read the poststructuralists alongside Poe 
implicitly argues for their work as a continuation of his project.
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Both Poe and the poststructuralists have been increasingly accused in critical discourse of 
a similar misguided removal from the material and political sphere into what has been cast as the 
Elysian safety of theory and gothic fantasy. But other scholarship has noted, to a certain extent 
for poststructuralism and a larger extent for Poe, that both bodies of work are constituted by their 
profound political sensitivity, or, at the very least, their engagement with their historical 
context.
24
 I argue that to elide the deeply—and radically—political work of both Poe and the 
poststructuralists is to miss the total reorganization of the social structure they make possible. 
Beyond their façade of gothic terror, Poe‟s tales reveal “systems of soothing”: social, cultural, 
and legal practices that calm the body politic into the rationalization and acceptance of brutal 
taxonomies in the furtherance of economic prosperity. The degree to which Poe‟s work refuses 
normalcy and comfort is an indication of the possibility for political critique that inheres in the 
work: in the nineteenth-century context, deviation from the norm becomes a mode of ethical 
reformulation and ontological survival. The very elasticity of Eureka‟s universe—now shrinking, 
now swelling—finally allays the threat of the structural machine‟s fixed gears. The essence of 
Poe‟s cosmology is prevarication, which provides a contrast to—even a violation of—the 
straight lines and fixed boundaries that constitute structures. 
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Notes 
 
1
 Occupying the opposite end of the spectrum is Harold Bloom, who cursorily misreads space in Poe: 
“Emerson exalted freedom, which he and Thoreau usefully called „wildness.‟ No one in Poe is or can be free or 
wild, and some academic admirers of Poe truly like everything and everyone to be in bondage to a universal 
past” (6). Of course, it is the very concepts of freedom and bondage that Poe interrogates in his work.  
 
2
 Douglas Anderson most explicitly articulates a taxonomic position for Poe when he writes that the narrator‟s 
descriptions of Ligeia suggest “the collective preoccupations of natural philosophy: a museum of curiosities 
for the biologist, the explorer, the moralist, or the astronomer to ponder” (125), and later describes the manse 
of Roderick Usher as “an ambitious cultural depository, an elaborate museum” (137-138). Usher‟s house, of 
course, self-destructs, as all taxonomic categories inevitably do in Poe. 
 
3
 Significantly, Johnson‟s remarks are part of a critical genealogy beginning with Lacan‟s reading of Poe (his 
“Seminar on „The Purloined Letter‟”) and Derrida‟s response to Lacan‟s reading. 
 
4
 In the introduction to American Gothic, Eric Savoy reads the gothic itself as mobile: “if the gothic may be 
said to be everywhere,” he states, “then it will cohere nowhere in particular” (ix). In his essay “The Face of the 
Tenant,” which appears in that same volume, he describes the gothic as “a fluid tendency rather than a discrete 
literary „mode‟” (6), an impulse I echo in my argument that movement in Poe‟s tales undoes the static 
discreteness of taxonomic categories. 
 
5
 In a related example, Leslie Fiedler convincingly locates The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym in the 
American south: “it grows not colder, but warmer and warmer, as Pym aboard the…Jane Guy, pushes closer 
and closer to the Pole” (258). 
 
6
 Justin D. Edwards makes an interesting comment about Poe‟s novel The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym 
that relates to my own argument about pale bodies and disruptions of taxonomy. He writes: “At the heart of 
Poe‟s text…is an examination of racial difference that reveals binaries as self-collapsing at the epistemological 
level” (13). I will argue for Poe in general—and in “Tarr and Fether” specifically—that binaries are indeed 
self-collapsing in Poe, which renders categories of knowledge—or knowledge itself (since knowledge is 
dependent upon  taxonomy)—meaningless or nonexistent. But I have not yet worked out an argument that uses 
Edwards‟ suggestion to explore the racial implications in my own assertion that “pale” bodies do the 
transgressive work in a Poe tale. Certainly, other bodies in Poe transgress as well. 
 
7
 In an article about “Tarr and Fether” and historical treatments of madness, Marek Paryz sees memory, not 
repetition, as the central trope for the tale, stating: “investigating the past is not exclusively a matter of moving 
back in time literally, it is as much a question of remembrance, which is quite prominent in the tale” (98). Here 
Paryz is not referring to the guests‟ repetitive locutions but to various temporal complications in the tale; 
however, I find it interesting to ponder that, through repetition, the guests are enacting a kind of memorializing 
or remembrance of their former selves. Through memento, the guests enact movement through time as well as 
space. 
 
8
 In his poetically-written 2009 study Pictures of Ascent, which argues for Poe‟s texts as particular kinds of 
journeys, Douglas Anderson reads the fragmentary messages in Poe‟s Pym in a way that corresponds to this 
moment in “Tarr and Fether.” He describes a “tantalizing verbal vessel [that] is both empty and overflowing” 
(114), which in many ways could describe Maillard‟s enunciation: words as containers that direct one toward 
meaning but contain no meaning themselves and, in Maillard‟s case specifically, direct the reader away from 
any meaning at all. 
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9
 See Barbara Johnson‟s discussion of paraphrase and quotation in reference to Poe, Lacan, and Derrida, which 
contains striking insights for a discussion of anecdote in “Tarr and Fether”—insights which are beyond the 
scope of this project. 
 
10
 I argue here that particular uses of language can create movement in space. Stephen Mainville takes a related 
approach;  in “Language and the Void” he argues through Pym and Julius Rodman that, in Poe, language is 
space: 
 
the intentional but uninterpretable mark is the frontier between consciousness and what is 
unconscious: its very existence makes it a trace of consciousness, yet its meaninglessness 
cannot be distinguished from dumb, unconscious nature. That is, the frontier presents a 
pretext of language. (348) 
 
Here Mainville asserts that ambiguous or undecipherable language is a kind of space, or at least a movement 
through space—an ever-advancing frontier. 
 
11
 Robert L. Carringer also recognizes the inherent relationship between violence and space in Poe. In his study 
on Poe‟s circumscription of space, he writes that “to circumscribe a Poe character is usually to involve him in 
some form of violent destructiveness” (20) and he describes this relationship as a “formula” for Poe wherein 
“circumscription involves destruction” (21). Colin (Joan) Dayan notes further: “Poe‟s tales do violence to all 
metaphysical categories or formal determinations” (Fables 133). As I argue above, it is this violence itself that 
dissolves taxonomic categories. 
 
12
 In reference to the triangulation of texts produced by Poe, Lacan, and Derrida, Barbara Johnson argues that 
“an unusually high degree of apparent digressiveness characterizes these texts, to the point of making the 
reader wonder whether there is really any true subject matter there at all” (343). Johnson‟s point implicitly 
reveals that “subject matter”—and its friend “plot”—might be just another taxonomic category to be defeated 
through digressive movement. 
 
13
 In his “Seminar on „The Purloined Letter‟” Jacques Lacan states: “in determining the scope of what speech 
repeats, it prepares the question of what symptoms repeat. Thus the indirect telling sifts out the linguistic 
dimension, and the general narrator, by duplicating it, „hypothetically‟ adds nothing to it. But its role in the 
second dialogue is entirely different” (35). Lacan here draws a parallel between speech and symptoms—a 
useful parallel for a story like “Tarr and Fether.” In light of the story, speech repetitions are, in some sense, an 
index of symptoms through which the narrator has tried to read the guests‟ insanity. Through Lacan‟s 
formulation I argue that, at this point in the text, the narrator joins the guests in a frenzy of multiple repetitions 
that, while appearing to be the same, actually accrue and produce difference—movement—at each utterance. 
The narrator here begins to produce the same “symptoms” by which he attempts to read the guests. 
 
14
 Marek Paryz makes a related claim by reading Philippe Pinel‟s 18th-century “Memoir on Madness” 
alongside “Tarr and Fether.” If a madman becomes threatening and arms himself, Pinel recommends closing 
the distance between superintendent and madman, both physically and through mimicking behavior. Paryz 
writes: “In the light of Pinel‟s claims, the superintendent, despite his numerous mundane preoccupations, 
appears close enough to madness as to exercise control over it” (99). 
 
15
 See Shawn Rosenheim‟s “Detective Fiction, Psychoanalysis, and the Analytic Sublime” for a strong 
interpretation of the workings of metonymy in Poe‟s detective stories, and especially how metonymy as an 
analytical practice can engender material effects.  
 
16
 I have drawn out Poe‟s use of metonymy here partially to foreground the inherent movement that metonymy 
implies through its distancing and separation, and also to suggest the potential for political upheaval that a 
metonymic poetics encodes. Metonymy creates distance and forces movement. Its employment requires that 
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the original object under interpretive attention must be relocated to a different, often unrelated or distantly 
related space. The reader is also implicated in the mechanism of metonymy: metonymic performance forces 
the relocation of the reading subject, who must follow the object through space to the new location in order to 
reattempt interpretation. It also takes up space: the trace of substitutions from an origin to its metonym inhabits 
the opening formed by the metonymic gesture. Metonymy becomes a mode of deviance in its refusal to be 
reabsorbed into the original object from which it arose. It doesn‟t require the ceaseless movement of deferral, 
repetition, or pursuit. It maintains distance while remaining still; it is distance. 
 
17
 It may be useful here to consider Derrida‟s notion of transformation: “Translation practices the difference 
between signified and signifier. But if this difference is never pure, no more so is translation, and for the notion 
of translation we would have to substitute a notion of transformation: a regulated transformation of one 
language by another, of one text by another (334). For Derrida, as for the narrator‟s relation to the guests, what 
cannot be translated is instead transformed. 
 
18
 Hubert Zapf expresses a related idea in his study of Poe. He writes that Eureka is an example of “the 
connection of structure, chaos, and self-reference which shapes Poe‟s thoughts, his worldview and his 
aesthetic, an aesthetic constituted in the constant subversion of its own ordering principles” (66). Zapf‟s 
mention of “ordering principles” points to the disassemblage of the taxonomic project so inherent to Poe, but 
I‟m most interested in the way Zapf describes Poe‟s corpus similarly to the way Foucault describes the deviant 
body—a self-referential, enclosed unit, structured to manage its own discipline, who nevertheless—especially 
in Poe—inaugurates structural chaos. 
 
19
 For example, in the introduction to their edition of Eureka, Stuart Levine and Susan F. Levine argue for 
“strong connections between Eureka, the works that Poe used in preparing it, and the rest of his writing” (xii). 
In his chapter on Eureka in his book The Measure of Poe, Louis Broussard also argues for “the work‟s relation 
to all of Poe‟s work” (57). 
 
20
 For the faint of heart—or short on time—Broussard provides an excellent and thorough summary of Eureka 
in The Measure of Poe. 
 
21
 Eric Savoy might read the “space” of Ligeia‟s body as, rather, a “discursive field in which a metonymic 
national „self‟ is undone by the return of its repressed Otherness” (vii); this is, in fact, how he describes the 
American gothic. While Savoy doesn‟t quite push the limits of space and boundaries to their inevitable 
dissolution, he does recognize that a critical approach to Poe must in some way use the vocabulary of spaces, 
especially in his assertion that the gothic situates readers “at the border of symbolic dissolution” (vii). 
 
22
 Levine and Levine suggest something similar in their introduction when they draw a thematic genealogy 
from Humboldt‟s Kosmos (to which Eureka is dedicated) to Carlyle‟s Sartor Resartus, Whitman‟s Leaves of 
Grass, Melville‟s Moby-Dick and Pierre, Thoreau‟s Walden (this would certainly make Poe uncomfortable) 
and the music of Liszt and Wagner; they identify all these works as “difficult to confine to convenient 
categories, works intended, indeed, to dissolve boundaries between categories that their creators felt to be 
oppressive” (xi). In this way, Levine and Levine see in Poe the drive to dissolve taxonomies, linking that drive 
in part to nineteenth-century American literature—although that link is not fully explored in their introduction. 
Colin (Joan) Dayan draws out this link more explicitly when she states: “By choosing the limited vista rather 
than the indefinite extent, Poe will exploit what most of his contemporaries saw as human restriction. For this 
idea of limited space was quite unorthodox in American thought, opposed to manifest destiny ideology, as well 
as to the sublime nature of the Hudson River poets and the godlike eye of the Orphic poets” (Fables 25). Here, 
Dayan locates in Poe a quirky and unexpected contribution to American taxonomic anxiety, one that opposes 
the mainstream. 
 
23
 Eric Savoy argues for something similar when he discusses poststructuralism in terms of his definition of the 
gothic, citing “the incipient or tacit „gothic‟ preoccupations of a variety of poststructuralist theories” (viii) such 
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as deconstruction. In his extended discussion about the interpenetration of Poe and poststructuralism, Joseph 
G. Kronick claims that “it has taken post-structuralists to secure for Poe a place in the American Renaissance” 
(23), and argues that it is the insistent “textuality” of Poe‟s texts that is responsible for their “receptivity…to 
post-structuralist readings” (24). 
 
24
 For example, both Eric Savoy and Teresa Goddu claim that the gothic, in general, is profoundly inseparable 
from its context. Savoy claims that American gothic “does not exist apart from its specific regional 
manifestations” (6), and for Goddu “the gothic, like all discourses, needs to be historicized; to read it out of 
cultural context is to misread it” (2). W.C. Harris argues for Eureka that it is “one of a series of nineteenth-
century American literary texts that attempt to come to terms with the problematic nature of unity in order to 
resolve certain logical contradictions within American social formation” (3). Terence Whalen‟s body of 
criticism links Poe‟s literature to industrial production, reading practices, political economy, and race politics 
in nineteenth-century America, discouraging the view that literature and capitalism “designate practices which 
are somehow discrete or even autonomous” (382). 
Important early criticism by Killis Campbell helped inaugurate the historicist trend in Poe studies, but 
interrogations of race are strikingly absent from his work; while he acknowledges that Poe wrote “with evident 
sincerity, in defense of Negro slavery” (111), he makes no effort to consider the contextual consequences of 
this fact. It is Leslie Fiedler who most visibly took up this task. In his midcentury analysis of Poe‟s Arthur 
Gordon Pym Fiedler famously wrote that “the proper subject for American gothic is the black man, from 
whose shadow we have not yet emerged” (258). Although Fiedler‟s assertion contains a kernel of 
oversimplification, he helped inaugurate current critical debates; sustained discussions of Poe and race have 
been taken up more recently—in fact, in current criticism this is the overwhelming trend—by many of the 
scholars already mentioned in this paper. This critical approach produced Toni Morrison‟s seminal essay 
“Unspeakable Things Unspoken,” in which Morrison argues for the absent presence of blackness, slavery, and 
race in all nineteenth-century American canonical literature; she entreats scholars to acknowledge the “shadow 
of the presence from which the text has fled” (12). The anthology Romancing the Shadow: Poe and Race 
claims for its inspiration Morrison‟s article. 
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